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RELIEF OF FARM MORTGAGORS FROM DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS
THE present economic crisis with the resulting ttringency in available funds,
has precipitated, foreclosures of farm mortgages.' Farm mortgage debts,
amounting to more than nine billion dollars, 2 were incurred prior to 1929 when
the prices of farm products were relatively high. The average income of farms
for 1932, however, was less than half of the return for 1929. 3 The plight of
the farm mortgagor has been further enhanced by the fact that because of the
depreciation in land values, 4 the price obtained at the sale is generally less than
the amount of the mortgage. As a result the mortgagor has been forced to
assume an increasingly greater liability for the unpaid balance of the debt. 0
Various devices for alleviating the position of the farm mortgagor have
been adopted. One of the most important, a procedure known as "reinstate-
ment," leaves the existing mortgage undisturbed, but provides for payment
of the mortgage in small monthly installments.6 Again, the Department of
Agriculture has recommended a system of paying interest with crops instead
of cash, and the Iowa program urges the mortgagee to collect only an amount
equal to a landlord's share of the produce of the farm.8 Another proposal has
been offered whereby existing mortgages are rewritten at a reduced rate of
interest and payment of mortgages is amortized over a period of years.D The
governor of Ohio has made the further suggestion that committees be established
in each county to persuade the mortgage holder to delay foreclosure and to
readjust the debt.'0 And the Pennsylvania Department of Banking is pursuing
a policy of protecting mortgagors by resorting to foreclosures only when it is
necessary to preserve the bank's assets for the benefit of depositors. 1 1 Recently
the United States Senate passed a bill making available $500,000,000 of Re-
construction Finance Corporation funds for loans to mortgage holders who agree
to forego their rights of foreclosure of farms.1 2 However, since none of the
above proposals have been accorded legislative or judicial sanction, they are
unenforceable without the acquiescence of the mortgagee. But at the present
time there are bills in five state legislatures proposing some form of moratorium
1. U. S. Daily, Jan. 17, 1933, at 1997.
2., Id., July 11, 1932, at 875.
3. Id., July 1, 1932, at 819; id., Nov. 22, 1932, at 1701.
4. Id., May 26, 1932, at 579.
5. 2 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 1212; 3 id. §§ 1583, 1695-1746.
6. U. S. Daily, Sept. 14, 1932, at 1307.
7. Id., March 14, 1932, at 67.
8. Id., Sept. 20, 1932, at 1339.
9. Id., Jan. 12, 1933, at 1973.
10. Id., Nov. 4, 1932, at 1609; see id., Jan. 18, 1933, at 2005.
11. Id., Sept. 3, 1932, at 1257. A similar procedure has been advocated for
national banks by the Comptroller of the Currency. Id., Feb. 2, 1933, at 2095.
12. Id., March 2, 1933, at 2247.
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-on foreclosure proceedings; and five bills proposing relief to debtors from
deficiency judgments.1 3
A novel procedure for relieving mortgagors from deficiency judgments has
been adopted in the recent case of Suring State Bank v. Gicsc.
14 In this case
the debt amounted to $2,000, and the premises were bought at the judicial sale
by the mortgagee for $600. The lower court confirmed the sale on the express
-condition that the plaintiff's motion for a deficiency judgment be denied. This
decision was upheld by the Wisconsin Supreme Court on the ground that under
these circumstances it was within the power of a court of equity to conduct a
hearing, establish the value of the property, and as a condition to the con-
firmation of the sale, require the fair value of the property to be credited upon
the foreclosure judgment. The court stated that although the lower court had
-expressly denied the deficiency judgment, in effect it had found the value of the
property to be equal to the debt, so that the debt was extinguished by the
-confirmation of the sale. The procedure was obviously propounded by the court
in an effort to evade a statute providing for deficiency judgments.'
6
The court offered two alternatives in effecting a denial of a deficiency judg-
ment. The first method is to decline the confirmation of the sale on the grounds
of inadequacy of price resulting from the current lack of competitive bidding.
But mere inadequacy of price is insufficient reason for denying the confirmation
-of a sale ' 6 unless coupled with fraud 17 or other circumstances.1 s Since there
was no proof of fraud, the court in the principal case was forced to rely on
those cases holding that mistake, misapprehension or inadvertance is a suf-
ficient ground for denying a confirmation of a sale at which the price obtained
was grossly inadequate. 19 An analysis of these cases reveals that in every
instance the mistake operated to keep away from the sale a bidder, directly
interested in the property, who would have bid higher than the final purchase
price. Therefore, although both mistake and the current depression tend to
decrease competitive bidding, the reliance of the court in the principal case on
these cases appears ill founded, inasmuch as there was no indication that a
higher bid might have been made at the foreclosure sale.2
0
The second alternative offered by the court for denying, or at least decreasing,
a deficiency judgment is the fi.ing of a minimum or upset price at which the
premises must be bid in if the sale is to be confirmed. Courts have generally
recognized the fact that the amounts involved in the foreclosure of corporate
13. Id., Feb. 27, 1933, at 2226.
14. Id., Feb. 17, 1933, at 2186.
15. Wis. STAT. (1931) § 278.04.
16. Roberson v. Matthews, 200 N. C. 241, 156 S. E. 496 (1931); First
National Bank v. Cahill, 160 Atl. 649 (N. J. Eq. 1932).
17. 3 JoNEs, op. cit. supra. note 2, § 2137.
18. Id. § 2108.
19. Bainder v. Sound Building and Loan Association, 161 Did. 597, 158 AUt.
2 (1932); Lemere v. White, 241 N. W. 105 (Neb. 1932); Dunlop v. Chenoweth,
-90 N. J. Eq. 85, 105 Atl. 592 (1918); German-American Bank v. Dorthy, 39
App. Div. 166, 57 N. Y. Supp. 172 (1899) ; Wagener v. Yetter, 280 Pa. 229, 124
Atl. 487 (1924); Rohrer v. Strickland, 116 Va. 755, 82 S. E. 711 (1914);
Griswold v. Barden, 146 Wis. 35, 130 N. W. 952 (1911).
20. This procedure is apparently unprecedented. Farmers' Bank v. Quick,
71 Mich. 534, 39 N. W. 752 (1888); Fink v. Murdock, 98 Neb. 1, 151 N. W.
951 (1915).
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mortgages necessitate the use of the upset price 21 to counteract the lack of
competitive bidding 22 and to provide the minority bondholders, who are unable
to bid for the property, with a cash value approximating the value in the now
securities that the majority bondholders are to receive. That this provision
for minority bondholders or similar claimants is the real object of the upset
price is clear from the expressions of writers 23 and the courts themselves."4
Only two exceptions to the use of the upset price exclusively in sales of cor-
porate property have been found. In one instance the court, desirous of
protecting the interests of a minor remainderman for whom the proceeds of
the sale were to be held in trust, found it more expedient that the land be sold
at its estimated value.25 In another case the mortgaged property consisted of
two lots on which, together with a third, a building was being constructed.
It was necessary for the three lots to be sold together because of their common
use, and in order to protect the interest of the mortgagor in the unmortgaged
lot, the court set a reserved price for the foreclosure sale.20 The magnitude of
the property foreclosed in the principal case was not a factor tending to
eliminate competitive bidding. Nor was the upset price established to benefit
the mortgagee. The purpose of this device as employed in the instant case,
therefore, differs radically from that in corporate foreclosures.
The Wisconsin court appears to have taken the initial step in the judicial
field toward a solution of the farm mortgage problem. In Bolick V. Prudontial'
Insurance Company of America,27 the North Carolina court recently held that
the financial depression, which rendered impossible the sale of land at its fair
market value, did not constitute sufficient grounds to warrant the enjoining of
a foreclosure sale. This principle is consistent with prior decisions, 28 apparently
based upon a reluctance to speculate on the future value of land.29
21. Weiner, Conflicting Functions of the Upset Price in a Corporate Re-
organization (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 132.
22. Only the mortgagees can be considered as possible purchasers. Louisville,
Trust Co. v. Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Ry. Co., 174 U. S. 674 (1899);
Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913); Kansas City Ry. v. Central
Union Trust Co. of New York, 271 U. S. 445 (1926).
23. Weiner, op. cit. supra note 21, at 136.
24. See In re Prudential Outfitting Co., 250 Fed. 504, 507 (S. D. N. Y. 1918);
Investment Registry, Limited v. Chicago, 1. E. Ry., 212 Fed. 594, 609 (C. C. A.
7th, 1913). It seems to have found its almost exclusive application in the,
federal courts. Two state courts have used it in sales of corporate property.
Sebree v. Cassville & W. R. Co., 212 S. W. 11 (Mo. 1919); Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co. v. Oregon Pacific Rr. Co., 28 Ore. 44, 40 Pac. 1089 (1895). Powabic
Mining Co. v. Mason, 145 U. S. 349 (1891), shows the fixing of an upset price,
for a corporate sale where no reorganization is to follow.
25. Bofil v. Fisher, 3 Rich. Eq. 1 (S. C. 1850).
26. M Clintic-Marshall Co. v. Scandinavian-American Building Co., 296 Fed
601 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924). See Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 180, 191 (1886)
Polk v. Affiick, 168 Ark. 903, 271 S. W. 962 (1925).
27. 164 S. E. 335 (N. C. 1932), discussed in Notes (1932) 81 U. OF PA, L.
Rv. 87; (1933) 11 N. C. L. REv. 172.
28. Thomas v. San Diego College Co., 111 Cal. 358, 43 Pac. 965 (1896);
Anderson v. White, 2 App. D. C. 408 (1894); Astor v. Romagne, 1 John. Ch.
310 (N. Y. 1814); McGown v. Sandford, 9 Paige 290 (N. Y. 1841); Muller v.
Bayly, 62 Va. 521 (1871); Darien Bank v. Varner, 165 S. E. 82 (Ga. 1932);
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UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE FRANCHISE TAX MIELSURED BY
CAPrrAL CONSISTING OF IMPORTS
THE line drawn by the Supreme Court of the United States to demark encroach-
ment of state taxation upon the powers reserved to the federal government
has taken a notoriously unpredictable and varied course,' the uncertainty of
which has recently been enhanced by its decision in Anglo-Chilcan Nitrate
Sales Corporation v. State of Alabama.
2  A New York corporation, having
qualified to do business in Alabama, imported nitrate from Chile through the
port of Mobile. The nitrate was stored in a public warehouse in Mobile and
kept there in the original packages until sold and delivered to the ultimate
consumers within and without the state. A salesman, who, paying his own
expenses, was compensated by commissions on his sales, solicited orders for
the nitrate, subject to approval by the corporation. After accepting the
orders, the corporation directed a stevedoring company, which had stored the
importations of nitrate in the warehouse, to forward the product to the pur-
chasers. All transactions were for cash. Payments were sent to a Mobile
bank and by it immediately transferred to the corporation in New York. It
had no property in Alabama other than the nitrate. Pursuant to a state
statute3 declaring that every foreign corporation doing business in the state
shall pay "an annual franchise tax of Two Dollars on each One Thousand
Dollars of the actual amount of capital employed in this State," the state tax
commission assessed against the corporation a franchise tax computed on the
basis of the value of the nitrate stored in the warehouse. On an appeal from
the Supreme Court of Alabama sustaining the validity of the tax;' the Supreme
Court of the United States, by a divided court,5 declared that the tax was
repugnant to those provisions of the Federal Constitution which prohibited
the states from taxing imports 6 and which accorded Congress the power to
regulate foreign commerce.7
The particular tax in question presents a somewhat novel variation from
the already complex mass of diversified taxes which have come before the
Supreme Court on the issue of intrusion by the states into the federal field.8
Commonwealth Bank and Trust Co. v. MacDonnell, 49 S. W. (2d) 525 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1932). However, courts have seized on unimportant procedural ir-
regularities as grounds for setting aside foreclosure sales in which the price
obtained due to a financial depression was grossly inadequate. See Vail v.
Jacobs, 62 Mo. 130 (1876); Wagener v. Yetter, supra note 19.
29. See Lipscomb v. Life Insurance Co., 138 Mo. 17, 39 S. W. 465 (1897).
1. See the series of articles by Powell, Indircct Enzcroachnient on Fcdcral
Authority by the Taxing Powers of the States (1917-1918) 31 HARV. L. R0v.
321, 572, 721, 932 and (1918-1919) 32 HAv. L. REv. 234, 374, 634, 902.
2. 53 Sup. Ct. 373 (1933).
3. Ala. Gen. Acts 1927, no. 163, § 54, p. 176.
4. State v. Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp., 142 So. 87 (Ala. 1932).
5. Mr. Justice Cardozo wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Mr. Justice
Brandeis and Mr. Justice Stone concurred.
6. U. S. Const., art. I, § 10, el. 2.
7. U. S. Coust., art. I, § 8, el. 3.
8. The innumerable methods used by the states to secure revenue are il-
lustrated in the review of the decisions of the Supreme Court on this general
problem by Powell, loc. cit. supra note 1. In New York v. Roberts, 171 U. S.
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Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's famous dictum, "the power to tax involves the
power to destroy," s has given rise to the continually reiterated statement that
a tax on a proper subject may be upheld even though measured by property
exempt from direct taxation.S Attempts by the states to secure additional
revenue by new methods of taxation have caused this principle to undergo
considerable modifications and qualifications." The resultant confusion, fur-
'thermore, has been intensified by shifts in attitude with changes in the Court's
personnel. 12 That the power of the state to tax is an essential element to the
validity of the tax has never been doubted.13 Conflict arises when it becomes
necessary to determine when the exercise of that power exceeds the bounds
of state authority.
A pragmatic inquiry into the incidence of the particular tax in the light of
the state and federal spheres of governmental activity can furnish the only
intelligible basis of decision.14 The tax involved in the instant case was im-
posed upon the privilege of doing intra-state business, a subject obviously
within the taxing power of the state, and the language of the statute expressly
negatives any intention to impose any tax not within the state's power.l&
It therefore seems that the tax cannot be condemned for the reason that the
purpose was to tax indirectly that which it could not tax directly.1 0 The
fact that the measure of the tax consisted solely of imports was plainly fortuit-
ous, the matter of imports having been affected only by reason of the business
conducted. Intent, however, should not be a controlling factor, since the
economic effect of the tax will be the same regardless of the intent of the
legislature.' 7 The conclusion of the court that the assessment in effect amounted
to a tax on imports since the only property in the state owned by the cor-
658 (1898), a tax very similar to the one imposed in the instant case wat
upheld upon substantially the same facts. This case was distinguished by the
court, but the soundness of the distinction is questionable. See Anglo-Chilean
Nitrate Sales Corp. v. State of Alabama, supra note 2, at 376.
9. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431 (U. S. 1819).
10. This development is discussed fully in Powell, op. cit. supra note 1, at
321 et seq.
11. See note 8, supra.
12. See Powell, An Imaginary Judicial Opinion (1931) 44 HARv. L. Ruv.
889 for a witty portrayal of the methods which the Supreme Court employs te
reconcile conflicting results obviously due to changes in the Court's personnel.
13. For instance, a direct tax on imports would be invalid. Brown v.
Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (U. S. 1827). A state may not impose a tax for
the privilege of engaging in interstate business. Ozark Pipe Line v. Monier,
266 U. S. 555 (1925); Alpha Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203 (1925).
14. See Powell, lo. cit. supra note 1.
15. "The provisions of this article do not apply to corporations organized
under the laws of the United States; nor to corporations engaging in or trans-
acting business of interstate commerce only within the state." ALA. COD1
(Michie, 1928) § 7217.
16. See note 17, infra.
17. Opposite results with substantially the same facts in Macallen Co. v.
Massachusetts, 279 U. S. 620 (1929) and Educational Films Corp. v. Ward,
282 U. S. 379 (1931), were reconciled on the basis of the intent of the legis-
lature to reach property exempt from direct taxation. These considerations.
form the basis of the article by Powell, loc. cit. supra note 12,
[Vol. 42
1933] NOTES
poration consisted of imports should not be a decisive factor in itself. Whether
or not the particular tax discourages importations and decreases the sources
of revenue available to the federal government furnishes an economic test
directed at the very reason for possible federal intervention. An answer to
the question of whether the tax interferes with this activity reserved to the
federal government by the Constitution would therefore seem to decide the
constitutional issue. Since the tax in the principal case was based upon the
value of domestic and foreign goods alike, it obviously can furnish no induce-
ment to importers to buy domestic goods instead. To exempt imports as a
measure of calculation of the franchise tax, on the other hand, would in effect
place a bounty on foreign goods. That the tax was not oppressive in amount1 8
furthermore, precludes the possible objection that it would unduly burden
foreign commerce regardless of the lack of discrimination.
VALIDITY OF VERDICT FOR LESS THAN AMOUNT PROPERL.Y RECOvEWAWLE
UNDER FINDINGS
IN a suit for breach of an installment contract to buy coal, judgment for the
defendant was reversed on two separate occasions by the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit on technical errors of instruction.' At a third trial,
under corrected instructions, the plaintiff recovered a verdict of $1.00.2 On an
appeal by the plaintiff from a denial of its motion for a new trial, the Circuit
Court, without considering the errors assigned, found that the minimum damages
properly recoverable by the plaintiff could be determined with substantial
accuracy at $18,250. The court ordered that the judgment below be reversed
and a new trial be granted on the issue of damages, unless the defendant paid
the minimum amount.3 On appeal by the defendant from this order, the
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Circuit Court and reinstated the
trial court's $1.00 judgment.4
It is settled that an appellate federal court will not review the trial court's
disposition of a motion for a new trial for error of fac 5  The reason stated
for this rule is either that a re-examination of facts found by a jury is un-
constitutional, 6 or that the question is solely within the discretion of the trial
18. See fiote 3, supra. The tax has been lowered to $1 per $1,000 since
January 1, 1932. Ala. Gen. Acts 1927, No. 163, § 56, p. 177.
1. Cub Fork Coal Co. v. Fairmont Glass Co., 19 F. (2d) 273 (C. C. A. 7th,
1927); Id., 33 F. (2a) 420 ,(C. C. A. 7th, 1929).
2. See Cub Fork Coal Co. v. Fairmount Glass Works, 59 F. (2d) 539 (C. C. A.
7th, 1932).
3. Ibid.
4. Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 53 Sup. Ct. 252 (U. S.
1933).
5. Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U. S. 24 (1879); Lincoln v. Power, 151
U. S. 436 (1893); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Proffitt, 218 Fed. 23 (C. C. A.
4th, 1914); DoBIm, FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1928) § 162.
6. Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U. S. 24 (1879); Thompkins v. Missouri, K. & T.
Ry. Co., 211 Fed. 391 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914); see Metropolitan Rr. Co. v. Moore,
121 U. S. 558, 573 (1887).
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court.7 The rule is especially applicable to motions for a new trial based on
the grounds that the verdict was excessive or inadequate.
8 But it is also
said that, where the verdict is not supported by the evidence or, in view of
the evidence, is contrary to instructions, the trial court's denial of a motion
for a new trial is an abuse of discretidn reviewable as a matter of law.9
The majority opinion in the instant case applies the doctrine that the
finding of a jury must be considered valid whenever possible.
1o It is argued
that the verdict is not inconsistent on its face because it might be interpreted
to mean that the jury found the issue of breach of contract in favor of the
defendant but wished to tax him with costs. In support of this position, it
is emphasized that the record does not disclose upon what grounds the motion
for a new trial was made, and that the Circuit Court of Appeals did not
expressly find an abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the motion.
The minority opinion argues more persuasively that a verdict of nominal
damages for breach of contract cannot, by any interpretation, be turned into
a finding that there was no breach whatsoever; and that if the jury's verdict
could be explained as an attempt to tax the defendant with costs, without any
instructions to that effect, there would none the less be a disregard of duy. If
the minority argument is accepted, the logical conclusion is that the real error
lies in the verdict itself. Both the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court were
at liberty to take notice of this error, even though not assigned.
1' In such a
case, therefore, the failure of the Circuit Court to find an abuse of discretion by
the trial court is apparently immaterial, and the denial of the motion might better
be regarded merely as an additional error.
In many cases of breach of contract it is the losing defendant who appeals,
on the grounds that under the evidence the jury should have found greater
damages or none at all.1 2 Except where the verdict is less than the specific
sum charged- to the jury as the measure of damages,'
3 the defendant's appeal
is unsuccessful. Either it is said that the jury's verdict may be explained and
there is no error; 14 or else it is held that even if there is error, it is beneficial
7. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Chicago & Alton Rr. Co., 132 U. S. 191 (1889);
Fitzgerald & Mallory Construction Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S. 98 (1890);
Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Heatlie, 48 F. (2d) 759 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931).
8. Lincoln v. Power, 151 U. S. 436 (1893) ; Louisiana Oil Refining Corporation
v. Reed, 38 F. (2d) 159 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930).
9. Pugh v. Bluff City Excursion Co., 177 Fed. 399 (C. C. A. 6th, 1910);
Glenwood Irrigation Co. v. Vallery, 248 Fed. 483 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918); United
Press Associations v. National Newspaper Association, 254 Fed. 284 (C. C. A.
8th, 1918); Cobb v. Lepisto, 6 F. (2d) 128 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925); American Rr.
Co. of Porto Rico v. Santiago, 9 F. (2d) 753 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926).
10. Union Pac. Rr. Co. v. Hadley, 246 U. S. 330 (1918); Dunn v. United
States, 284 U. S. 390 (1932).
11. "The Court may notice a plain error not assigned". Rule 10 (4), Rules
of the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for Seventh Circuit (1930). See Reliable
Incubator & Brooder Co. v. Stahl, 105 Fed. 663, 668 (C. 0. A. 7th, 1901) ; RuleI
21, § 4, and 35, § 1, 222 U. S., Appendix, pp. 27, 37. See Columbia Heights
Realty Co. v. Rudolph, 217 U. S. 547, 552 (1910).
12. See (1924) 31 A. L. R. 1091, for cases collected.
13. Stetson v. Stindt, 279 Fed. 209 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922).
14. E.g., Benedict v. Michigan Beef & Provision Co., 115 Mich. 527, 73 N. W.
802 (1898).
[Vol. 42
to the defendant and he cannot complain.
15 The reason for placing the motion
for a new trial within the discretion of the trial judge where the excess or
inadequacy of damages is a debatable question of fact, is that he has seen the
witnesses and is better qualified to decide the question.
1 0 If the damages are
considered excessive because the jury has misapprehended the evidence, the
court may give the plaintiff a choice of remitting the calculated excess or
undergoing a new trial.'7 Thus in tort cases the trial court may keep the
awards uniform within the district of the court's jurisdiction.
18
A federal appellate court cannot reverse a judgment for one party and enter
judgment for the other.' 9 Nor can it modify and affirm an erroneous judgment
by correcting the amount of damages,20 unless they can be computed mathe-
matically,21 or the remitting party accepts the award as corrected.=- Since
the defendant in the instant case refused to pay the minimum amount of
damages found by the Circuit Court, the conditional order necessitated a fourth
trial.2 3 The verdicts of two juries finding for the defendant had been reversed
on technical errors of instruction.2 4 A third jury under correct instructions
was willing to find only $1.00 damages. Under these circumstances, the result
reached by the Supreme Court is perhaps justifiable as terminating extended
litigation.23
INCLUSION OF LONG TERi INDEBTEDNESS IN BASE OF FRANCHISE TAx
THE corporate franchise tax law of Texas 1 provides for a tax based upon a
proportion of outstanding capital stock, surplus and undivided profits,
2 plus
15. Kawfield Oil Co. v. Braymer Drilling Co., 287 Fed. 713 (C. C. A. 8th,
1923).
16. See Metropolitan Rr. Co. v. Moore, 121 U. S. 558, 573 (1887).
17. Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 69 (1889); see
Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22, 29 (1889).
18. See Jennings v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 43 F. (2d) 397, 399 (D.
Minn. 1930).
i9. Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co., 228 U. S. 364 (1913).
20. Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22 (1889).
21. Bank of Kentucky v. Ashley, 2 Pet. 327 (U. S. 1829); Washington &
Georgetown Rr. v. Harmon, 147 U. S. 571 (1893).
22. Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U. S. 397 (1896); Hazard Powder Co. v. Volger, 58
Fed. 152 (C. C. A. 8th, 1893); Mullins Lumber Co. v. Williamson & Brown
Lumber & Land Co., 255 Fed. 645 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918); see Kennon v. Gilmer,
131 U. S. 22 (1889).
23. See note 2, supra.
24. A fourth trial could be limited to the issue of damages. Twenty-One
Mining Co. v. Original Sixteen to One Mine, 265 Fed. 469 (C. C. A. 9th, 192q);
American Rr. Co. of Porto Rico v. Santiago, supra note 9; see Gasoline Products
Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U. S. 494 (1931).
25. A Virginia statute prohibits both trial and appellate courts from granting
more than two new trials on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the
evidence. VA. CODE ANN. (1930) § 6260. At common law a third jury was
seldom granted because the oaths of the first two were considered sufficient
3 BL. COmm.* 386.
1. TEY. GEN. LAWS (5th called sess. 1930) e. 68.
2. A franchise tax based upon the proportion of outstanding capital stocl;,
surplus and undivided profits employed in business within the state complies
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the amount of outstanding bonds, notes and debentures other than those ma-
turing within less than a year from the date of issuance, to be measured by
the proportion of the gross receipts from business done in Texas to the total
gross receipts. In a suit brought by several domestic and foreign corpora-
tions 3 to enjoin its enforcement, the District Court held that the exaction was
valid as a privilege tax having a reasonable relation to the benefit granted. 4
The extension of the tax in this statute to include long term indebtedness
represents an attempt to reach corporations which, though transacting a large
volume of business within the state, operate on a small capitalization and
employ borrowed funds, thus escaping the usual privilege tax upon outstanding
capital stock and surplus. The fact that the outstanding long term indebted-
iiess may not represent actual value held by the corporation would appear not
to offend against the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment as
a standard which would apply disproportionately to the real value of the assets
of different taxpayers. 5 Where the tax has not been clearly unreasonable, the
assessment of non-existing values has never deterred the court from declaring
with constitutional inhibitions against burdening interstate commerce and tax-
ing extraterritorial property. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Arkansas, 235
U. S. 350 (1914) (measure based upon a proportion of outstanding capital
stock held unobjectionable); St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Middletamp,
256 U. S. 226 (1921) (surplus may be added as a basis upon which to comptite
the tax); Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U. S. 330 (1923) (gross receipts
may be used as a measure); cf. Pittsburgh Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421
(1894).
3. The commerce clause forbids state taxation if the proceeds are of purely
interstate commerce (Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S.
203 (1925)), and due process denies the right to levy upon property of a foreign
corporation outside the state (St. Louis Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U. S.
346 (1922)). The original doctrine that since a state may exclude corporations
from doing business within its borders, it may impose any condition upon the
grant (Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305, (1891)) seems to
persist in the case of domestic corporations. Kansas City Rr. Co. v. Stiles, 242
U. S. 111 (1916) and Roberts & Shaffer Co. v. Emmerson, 271 U. S. 50 (1926)
(tax on entire authorized capital stock permitted). The purely interstate busi-
ness of a foreign corporation may not be taxed (Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v.
Monier, 266 U. S. 555 (1925)), but where the corporation is doing an intra-
state business as well, property or capital used in interstate commerce may
be included in computing the tax (United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247
U. S. 321 (1918)). It would appear therefore that only foreign corporationa
doing foreign business could effectively contest the validity of the statute in
the instant case.
4. Southern Realty Corporation v. McCallum, 1 Fed. Supp. 614 (W. D. Tex.
1932).
5. This vice was found in the use of total authorized capital stock as a
base for taxation of foreign corporations. Air-way Electric Appliance Corp.
v. Day, 266 U. S. 71 (1924). An additional argument which apparently swayed
the court in that case, and which may be relevant to the taxation of the face
value of long term indebtedness, was that the inclusion in the base of hypo-
thetical values results in the taxation of interstate commerce and extra-state
values when the corporation does interstate business and owns extra-state
property or engages in extra-state enterprise.
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franchise laws constitutional.0 Nor is it necessary in order to sustain the
Texas statute to invoke the presumption that value was received for the out-
standing indebtedness.7 For, in the computation of a franchise tax judicial
sanction has been accorded both the use of the par value of capital stock without
regard to its actual value, and the assessment of no-par value stock 8 at an
arbitrary flat rate.9 Were the application of the provision for the inclusion of
outstanding indebtedness limited to corporations doing business on a disguised
capital structure the tax would be unexceptionable. Its comprehensiveness
is such,' 0 however, that it also affects corporations operating on a sufficient
capitalization and a large outstanding bona fide indebtedness, with the result
that the addition to the base is likely so to raise the tax on local business that
it will have to be paid from the proceeds of foreign or interstate transactions.
But this fact need not invalidate an excise, as distinguished from a direct tax
on property or income.11
6. It would seem that the tax on authorized capital stock might have been
declared constitutional in spite of its involving a palpable over-valuation of
the corporation's assets if the court had said this was not a tax on property
but a tax merely on the privilege of doing local business. See Powell, Business
Taxes and the Federal Constitution (1925) NAT. TAX Ass'N PROCEDINGS 184.
7. Bell's Gap Rr. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232 (1890).
8. International Shoe Co. v. Shartel, 279 U. S. 429 (1928). Cf. Wickersham,
Taxation of No Par Value Stock (1926) 39 HARv. L. REV. 39.
9. The suggestion of the court in the instant case that, if the capital repre-
sented by this long-time indebtedness is lost, the loss to that extent impairs
the capital stock, and by reduction in that capital the matter may be properly
adjusted, is reminiscent of the reply to similar protests against over-valuation
of non-par value stock: "It may be assumed that if the doing of business with
a greater number of non-par shares is not deemed by the tax-payer to be a
valuable privilege, it will reduce the number of shares." New York v. Latrobe,
279 U. S. 421 (1929). Both courts appear to overlook the practical irrelevance
to most cases of this proposed palliative. It is safe to say that not many
corporations can now escape from excessive exactions under a statute providing
that "A corporation may decrease its capital stock by such amounts as its
stockholders may decide by a two-thirds vote of all its outstanding stock ....
No such decrease shall prejudice the rights of any creditors of such corpora-
tion. . . ." TEx. STAT. (Vernon, 1928) § 1332.
10. The Texas act differs in this respect from analogous provisions in the
franchise laws of Rhode Island and North Carolina. The former statute is
limited to certain types of corporations, and, while including in the base out-
standing bonded indebtedness, debentures and "such other indebtedness as is
not bona fide or is a cover for a division of its profits," provides specifically
for relief in cases where its application would result in an excessive exaction.
"Any corporation which is aggrieved by the valuation of its capital stock or
the tax assessed against it as finally fixed by the board of tax commissioners,
as provided by § 11 may at any time after such assessment and prior to expira-
tion of three months after time for payment of the tax petition the superior
court praying relief." R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) c. 38, §§ 10, 11. Compare
N. C. PuB. LAws (1931) c. 427, § 210.
11. Bass, Ratcliffe and Gretton v. State Tax Commission, 266 U. S. 271
(1924) (the fact that local operations yielded no net income during the pre-
ceding year held insufficient to invalidate an assessment under a tax for the
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Perhaps the most undesirable feature of the extension of the tax base in
the Texas statute is the absence of provision, frequently found in tax mea-
sures, for administrative amelioration where the equities of the individual
case justify relief.12 The possibility of recourse to the courts is not an
adequate substitute since it has been held that where the general scheme of
allocation is not unreasonable on principle, the burden is on the complainant
to show explicitly that the statutory ratio yields an erroneous result, a dubious
task entailing a precise apportionment to each state of all the corporate busi-
ness there performed.1S Although this burden has on occasion been sustained,14
it would appear that dependence upon litigation as a remedial device should
be discouraged,' 5 and an excise failing to furnish an opportunity for admin-
istrative relief may well be subjected to unusual scrutiny in the hope that
such provisions will become more general.
Excessive taxation of the intrastate business of corporations carrying a
large bona fide indebtedness under the statute in the instant, case may, how-
ever, be avoided by the organization in different jurisdictions of distinct sub-
sidiaries.10 Although the corporate fiction has been ignored in order to prevent
obvious tax avoidance by this method,' 7 courts in the main have not disturbed
such entities legitimately created for allocation of functions,18 and where the
courts have gone behind these arrangements, the tax has been assessed upon
the basis of an assumed income of the subsidiary under a fair contract between
it and its parent.' 9 Finally, the inclusion of long term indebtedness in the base
of the Texas corporate franchise tax adds another method of assessment
2 0 to
privilege of doing business in the state during the year). In this connection
it is interesting to note that no specific license tax on local business has ever
been declared invalid on the ground that it is so high as to amount to an
exaction on interstate commerce or that it taxes property or business outside the
taxing state. See Postal-Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U. S. 252 (1919);
Postal-Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Tremont, 255 U. S. 124 (1921).
12. The tax authorities under such provisions may scale down the tax on
the basis of a general impression that it is excessive, without requiring math-
ematical demonstration. Powell, op. cit. supra note 6. Where such relief is
open and not sought, judicial releif has been denied. Gorham Mfg. Co. v.
State Tax Commission, 266 U. S. 263 (1924).
13. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (1920).
14. Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123 (1931); Standard
Oil Co. v. Thoresen, 29 F. (2d) 708 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
15. For a fuller discussion see Comment (1931) 40 YALrE L. J. 1273.
16. For a discussion of this practice see Magill, Allocation of Income by
Corporate Contract (1931) 44 HARV. L. REv. 935; Note (1931) 31 CoL. L. 1 v.
719.
17. U. S. v. Barwin Realty Co., 25 F. (2d) 1003 (E. D. N. Y. 1928);
Palmolive Co. v. Conway, 43 F. (2d) 226 (W. D. Wis. 1930). To the same
effect, see Buick Motor Co. v. Milwaukee, 43 F. (2d) 385 (E. D. Wis. 1930) (com-
mission allowed to disregard separate corporation set-up where actual income
shown to exceed "contract" income).
18. Note (1927) 27 CoL. L. REv. 753.
19. Studebaker Corp. v. Gilchrist, 244 N. Y. 114, 155 N. E. 68 (1926);
Palmolive Co. v. Conway; Buick Motor Co. v. Milwaukee, both supra note 17.
20. The only analogous statutes (supra, note 10) are more restricted In




the group of business taxes already so diverse and unrelated.2 1  The use of
a uniform mode of assessment by all the states, it has been asserted, is more
important than the use of an accurate one by a few,- for a corporation doing
business in several states now runs the risk of paying taxes on the basis of
more than 100% of its assets. However, in view of the absence of signs of
approaching unanimity on the point, and the unprecedented need for additional
revenue, any single state is hardly to be expected to forego attempts to bring
in her fair share of corporate income.
PRIORITY OF SECOND MORTGAGEE'S LIEN FOR TAX PAYMENTS IN FORECLOSUnE
BY FIRST MORTGAGEE
COURTs generally allow recovery from the mortgagor of sums expended by
mortgagees in discharging taxes assessed against the mortgaged property.1
And where such payments are made by a junior encumbrancer, it occasionally
becomes necessary to determine whether he is entitled to assert priority of this
claim over all other liens and antecedent mortgages upon distribution of the
proceeds of a foreclosure sale. In Lawycrs Title and Garanzty Company v.
Claren,2 upon foreclosure of the first mortgage, the second mortgagee counter-
claimed for the amount of taxes, water-rates, and assessments paid by him to
protect the property, on the ground that such payments gave rise to a prior
lien on the encumbered premises by reason of his right to be subrogated to the
municipality's lien for unpaid taxes. It did not appear that such payments
had been made pursuant to any agreement with, or notice to, the first mortgagee.
The Appellate Division, in denying the counterclaim, declared that the junior
encumbrancer was limited alternatively upon the mortgagor's default to a
foreclosure of his mortgage, or to the inclusion of the taxes paid in the amount
of the mortgage debt.
One of the grounds of the decision was that under the city charter payment
discharged the lien for taxes. 3 But it has been held that a junior mortgagee
-whose payments were made by way of redemption after a sale for non-payment
of the taxes is not deprived of a right to reimbursement out of the property in
advance of the prior mortgage.4  Moreover, it cannot be supposed that the
legislature intended more than merely to discharge the lien when payment was
made by the mortgagor. Otherwise, in accordance with the court's strict inter-
pretation, the statute has the effect of depriving parties ordinarily entitled
to subrogation of any recovery where they do not possess an existing mortgage
to which they can add the sum of their expenditures. Furthermore, the remedy
permitted by a more liberal construction of the statute is not subversive of
public policy. For subrogation to the paramount lien of the municipality against
the property is not open to the theoretical objection that it in effect amounts to
21. See Gerstenberg, Report of Committce on Standardization and Simpli-
fwation of the Business Taxes (1929) NAT. TAX ASS'N PROCEEDINGS 152.
22. Ibid.
1. Pennsylvania Co. v. Bergson, 159 Atl. 32 (Pa. 1932); 3 COOLEY, TAXATION
(4th ed. 1924) § 1263.
2. 237 App. Div. 188, 260 N. Y. Supp. 847 (2d Dep't 1932).
3. ASH, GREATER NEW YORK CHARTER (5th Ed. 1925) § 1017. It is spe-
cifically provided that "All taxes . . . shall continue to be, until paid, a lien
thereon, and shall be preferred in payment to all other charges."
4. Fiacre v. Chapman, 32 N. J. Eq. 463 (1880).
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a delegation to a private individual of functions of a public nature reserved
solely to the government. 5 Instead, the junior mortgagee is merely enabled to
assert priority over other liens of his claim to the proceeds of the foreclosure
sale.6
A further reason advanced by the court for denying relief was that under the
circumstances the second mortgagee was a mere volunteer and could not claim
subrogation against a person who was not liable for the indebtedness. The
voluntary character of a payment is not considered a bar to subrogation where
it was brought about by mistake induced by forgery, 7 or under compulsion of
threatened prosecution,8 or through the incentive to protect an interest In land
actually,9 or even erroneously believed to be,1o possessed by the payor. Con-
sequently, it has been held that inasmuch as a junior mortgagee making such
payments to protect his mortgage acts justifiably and beneficially in the interest
of the prior mortgagee as well as himself, he has the right of subrogation to
the paramount lien of the municipality.
11 And since in most jurisdictions the
tax lien is enforceable solely against the assessed property, and continues despite
change in ownership of the land,12 the fact that as between mortgagor and
mortgagees, the mortgagor assumed the obligation to discharge the taxes, should
in no way affect the priority which is accorded a subrogee of the municipality.
It is apparent, however, that subrogation may operate to deprive the first
mortgagee of at least part of the security upon which he based his original
mortgage loan. Therefore, courts have not hesitated to deny the remedy whero
it appeared that the prior mortgagee might have been misled into delaying the
foreclosure of his mortgage by the junior mortgagee's concealment of the fact
that he, and not the defaulting mortgagor, was making the payments.
13
Express notice to the prior encumbrancer has not been prescribed as a condition
precedent to the right of a mortgagee, acting above suspicion, to protect his
interest in the property.14 A strict interpretation of the instant decision seems
to indicate the necessity of notice. But it is urged that even in the absence of
5. Sperry v. Butler, 75 Conn. 369, 53 Atl. 899 (1903); McInerny v. Reed,
23 Iowa 410 (1867); cf. Note (1923) 37 HAnv. L. REV. 259, discussing the
limitations upon a surety's right to be subrogated to the remedies and rights
of the sovereign power.
6. Noeker v. Howry, 119 Mich. 626, 78 N. W. 669 (1899); Fiacre v. Chapman,
supra note 4. See also In re Baltimore Pearl Hominy Co., 5 F. (2d) 553
(C. C. A. 4th, 1925).
7. Title Guaranty and Trust Co. v. Haven, 196 N. Y. 487, 89 N. E. 1082,
1085 (1909) (where bank had paid the proceeds of a forged check to the tax
collector). '
8. Avey v. American Surety Co. of New York, 260 N. Y. Supp. 828, 833
(Sup. Ct. 1932).
9. Camden v. Fink Coal & Coke Co., 106 W. Va. 312, 145 S. E. 575 (1928).
10. SHELDON, SUBROGATION (2d ed. 1893) § 36a.
11. See cases cited supra note 6. See also Marks v. Baum Building Co,, 13
Okla. 264, 175 Pac. 818 (1918).
12. CooLEY, op. cit. supra note 1, §§1238, 1239.
13. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Richland Farming Co., 180 Ark. 442,
21 S. W. (2d) 954 (1929); Corning Bank.& Trust Co. v. Federal Land Bank
of St. Louis, 52 S. W. (2d) 975 (Ark. 1932); Warranty Building & Loan
Association v. Cimirro Construction Co., 111 N. J. Eq. 8, 160 Atl. 847 (1932).
14. See cases cited supra note 6.
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any agreement or notice, if there is no showing that the prior mortgagee was
deceived to his detriment, subrogation should not be denied to a junior en-
cumbrancer who protects not only his own interest in the property, but that
of the prior mortgagee as well, in removing the threat of a possible tax sale.
RIGHTS TO STOCK DIVIDEND DEcLARED ON SPECIFIC LEGACY BEFonE
TESTATOR'S DEATH
WHEN a testator before his death receives a stock dividend upon shares which
in his will he has made the subject of a specific legacy, and the dividend shares
are still in the testator's possession at his death, should these additional shares
go to the specific or to the residuary legatee? The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in a recent case 1 concluded that the specific legatee was not
entitled to the dividend shares, since in setting apart the original shares fhe
testator had not intended to create a fund which would draw to itself such
accretions of stock. The result of this decision is in accord with that reached
by several other courts which have discussed the problem.2
The claim of the specific legatee to the dividend shares is founded upon the
theory that the real subject of a specific bequest of stock in a corporation is
testator's proportionate equitable interest in the assets owned by the corporation
at the date of the will. The subsequent receipt by testator of a stock dividend
is considered not to add to his proportionate interest,3 but merely to increase
the number of shares by which it is represented. It is argued, therefore, that,
unless the stock dividend is based upon assets acquired by the corporation
after the date of testator's will,4 the dividend shares and the original shares
together represent the thing bequeathed and both should go to the specific legatee.
The increase in the number of shares is said not to adeem the legacy, since the
similar increase effected by a stock split-up, whereby a corporation substitutes
for its outstanding stock a greater number of shares of smaller par value, does
not constitute an ademption of a legacy of the original shares.5
1. First National Bank of Boston v. Union Hospital, 183 N. E. 247 (Mass.
1932). On making his will, testator deposited the shares which he was be-
queathing specifically in a bank, which was to hold them "subject to his order";
title to the stock was not transferred to the bank. Thereafter but before
testator's death both a stock split-up and a stock dividend were declared by
the corporation. The bank exchange the old shares for the new in the split-up,
but testator having received the cash dividends also received the stock dividend.
2. Griffith v. Adams, 106 Conn. 19, 137 Atl. 20 (1927); Hicks v. Kerr, 132
Md. 693, 104 AtI. 426 (1918); Matter of Brann, 219 N. Y. 263, 114 N. E. 404
(1916); Sherman v. Riley, 43 R. I. 202, 110 Atl. 629 (1920); cf. Goode v.
Reynolds, 208 Ky. 441, 271 S. W. 600 (1925). Contra: Chase National Bank v.
Deichmiller, 107 N. J. Eq. 379, 152 Atl. 697 (1930).
3. Such a dividend involves merely a book transfer of assets from the
surplus to the capital accounts. Griffith v. Adams, supra note 2; 11 FLLrcnn,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS (1932) § 5359.
4. The legacy would of necessity refer to the corporate assets of that date,
since as to specific legacies a will speaks as of the date of its execution.
THOmPSON, CoNsTRuTIoN AND INTERPRETATION oF WILrs (1928) § 26; REMSEN,
WmLS AND TRuSTs (1930) 152.
5. Comment (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 101.
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That the courts have been influenced by such an argument is demonstrgted
by their attempts to reconcile with it their decisions that the dividend shares
should go to the residuary legatees. For example, the court in the principal
case denies the premise of the specific legatee that a stock dividend adds nothing
to testator's interest in the corporation, holding that such a dividend is an
"accretion" to the original shares.0  Somewhat similar are the declarations of
other courts T that stock dividends represent a segregated portion of surplus
assets and so cannot be distinguished from cash dividends, which it is agreedO
go to the residuary legatees. One court
9 apparently accepted the specific
legatee's arguments but distinguished between stock dividends and stock split-ups
in holding that the increase in testator's shares resulting from the dividend
constituted an ademption of the legacy pro tanto.
Perhaps the true explanation of the courts' decisions may be found in the
tendency to regard stock legacies as money legacies
19 rather than as bequests
of proportionate interests in the corporate assets. The real desire of testator
in most cases is that the specific legatee shall receive a bequest of a value
approximately equal to that of the stock at the date of the will. Apparently
recognizing this, several courts l have set forth in detail the changes in 
value
resulting from the stock dividends. Thus where a legacy including the dividend
shares would have given to the specific legatee a bequest far more valuable
than were the original shares at the date of the will, it has been inferred
12
that testator intended to bequeath only the original shares. And in the only
case13 in which the specific legatee has been held entitled to receive the
dividend shares, it appeared that a legacy consisting only of the original shares
would have been insufficient in value, because of the decrease resulting from
the stock dividend, to accomplish the declared purpose of the legacy.
THE SUPREME COURT AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
THE ground stated in the famous Grannis case for the refusal of the United
States Supreme Court to take jurisdiction of a petition for a declaratory judg-
ment was that ". . . the judicial power vested by Article III of the Con-
stitution in this Court and the inferior courts of the United States . . . extends
only to 'cases' and 'controversies'. "1 The Grannis case was later relied
6. 183 N. E. at 249.
7. Griffith v. Adams; Hicks v. Kerr, both supra note 2; and see Iatter of
Brann, supra note 2, at 267, 114 N. E. at 405, where the corporation distributed
not its own stock but shares in a subsidiary, the court stating that such a dis-
tribution of stock was like a stock dividend. So also, as to some of the stock
distributed, in Griffith v. Adams, supra note 2. It would seem, however, that such
a distribution of assets owned by the corporation more closely resembled a cash
dividend. See FLETCHER, loc. cit. supra note 3.
8. Hicks v. Kerr, and Sherman v. Riley, both supra note 2; 7 THOMPSON, LAW
OF CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 5400.
9. Matter of Brann, supra note 2.
10. Comment (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 101.
11. See especially Griffith v. Adams, supra note 2, at 22, 137 Atl. at 22; Chase
National Bank v. Deichmiller, supra note 2, at 382, 152 Atl. at 699.
12. Matter of Brann, supra note 2.
13. Chase National Bank v. Deichmiller, supra note 2.
1. Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 293 U. S. 70, 74 (1927).
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upon in Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers, as authority for
the statement that,2 "This Court has no jurisdiction to review a mere declara-
tory judgment." And in the Chicago Auditorium case, Mr. Justice Stone, in
a concurring opinion, criticized the Court for needlessly declaring that Con-
gress 3 "may not constitutionally confer on the federal courts jurisdiction to
render declaratory judgments in cases where that form of judgment would
be an appropriate remedy, or that this Court is without constitutional power
to review such judgments of state courts when they involve federal questions."
At the present term, in the case of Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry.
v. Wallace,4 a unanimous Court has decided that it did possezs the power to
review a declaratory judgment originating in a State court. Suit had been
brought in a Tennessee court under the Tennessee Uniform Declaratory Judg-
ment Act 5 for a judicial declaration that a state excise tax8 was, as applied
to the plaintiff, unconstitutional. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court
from a final judgment of the state court adjudging the tax valid, the plaintiff
contending that the tax act was, as to him, an infringement of the "commerce
clause" and of the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution. The
Court assumed jurisdiction on the ground that it would look to the nature
of the proceeding and, as bearing thereon, the effect of a judgment upon the
rights of the parties, rather than to the particular label attached to the pro-
cedure followed in the state court. And since the issues made by the facts
would clearly constitute a "case" or "controversy" if raised in a suit to enjoin
the collection of the tax (although by statute no injunction was available in
the state court),7 the Court held that a "case" was presented.S The bogey
which for so long confused the declaratory judgment with an advisory opinion
or a moot case has thus finally been laid to rest. All that is needed for the
exercise of judicial power is a "real and substantial" controversy, raised by one
party against another party having adverse interests, and susceptible of
judicial determination.
2. 276 U. S. 71, 89 (198).
3. Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U. S. 274, 290 (1928).
4. 53 Sup. Ct. 345 (U. S. 1933).
5. TENN. CoDn (Shannon, 1932) § 8835. The Uniform Act is in force in
16 of the states, and Porto Rico. Similar statutes have been enacted in 13
states, Hawaii, and the Philippines.
6. Id. §§ 1127, 1128.
7. It is apparently of no consequence, for purposes of the present case,
whether other relief would actually have been available to the litigant, and no
attempt will be made to discuss the point. In American Airways v. Wallace,
57 F. (2d) 877 (D. Tenn. 1932), the validity of the tax involved in the instant
case was determined in injunction proceedings in a federal court The Ten-
nessee statute prohibits suits to enjoin the collection of this tax. TaN. CODDI
(Shannon, 1932) § 1138. The plaintiff in the instant case attempted to cir-
cumvent the statute, and at the same time avoid the risk that the federal courts
might declare themselves unwilling to grant an injunction where the state law
forbade it, by suing under the state declaratory judgment law.
See Borchard, Judicial Relief for Peril and Insccurity (1932) 45 HAnv. L. REV.
793, 846, advocating the declaratory action as a substitute for the injunction
in tax suits.
8. Cf. Fidelity Nat. Bank v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123 (1927); Harr v. Pioneer
Mechanical Corp., 1 Fed. Supp. 294 (S. D. N. Y. 1932); but of. United States
v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. R. Co., 273 U. S. 299, 314 (1927).
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The formula thus announced by Mr. Justice Stone for the Court is un-
doubtedly excellent. By assuming jurisdiction in the particular case, the
Court granted the litigants a inal determination of the federal question in-
volved without the necessity of further proceedings. For appellate procedure
generally, the policy here adopted of looking to the issues made by the facts
rather than to the form in which they were presented to the trial court, is
salutary. And the reiteration by the Court of its refusal to interfere with
state procedure D ii praiseworthy.
The Court was given the opportunity in the Wallace case of avoiding any
discussion of its previous dicta in the Grannis and Chicago Auditorium cases
by confining its decision to the one point whether it would review a declara-
tory judgment of the highest court of the State which presented a "case" or
"controversy." Instead of taking advantage of this limited opportunity the
Court undertook to deal with the whole procedure for declaratory judgments,
as a remedial institution, regardless of the particular forum, and concluded
that if the petition presented a "case" or "controversy" calling for judicial
relief it could and should be passed upon and decided by a court. The im-
portant conclusion is this: "As the prayer for relief by injunction is not a
necessary prerequisite to the exercise of judicial power, allegations of threat-
ened injury which are material only if an injunction is asked, may likewise
be dispensed with if, in other respects, the controversy presented is, as in this
case, real and substantial."
The requisites of a valid judicial judgment, whether denominated declaratory
or by any other name, are that the "case" must place in issue the plaintiff's
rights, that the defendant must be an adversary party, that their "contro-
versy" must be "real and substantial," and that the court's judgment will
conclusively determine the issue raised. The Court reiterates the conclusion,
expressed on several recent occasions,10 that process of execution is not an
indispensable adjunct of a judgment or of judicial power, but rather that
adjudication or determination of contested rights is the essence of the judicial
function, a function exercised by the Court on innumerable occasions in the
past by rendering declaratory judgments without using that special name.11
Generally speaking, only the absence of execution process or a coercive decree
distinguishes the declaratory judgment from the more traditional type of
judgment.
By this decision the .Court has in effect overruled the dicta in the Grannis
and Chicago Auditorium cases, resting its conclusion upon the ground that
what was said in those cases about declaratory judgments was based on the
assumption that those cases were "thought" to require advisory opinions on
"an uncertain or hypothetical state of facts." This is not true on the facts
of those cases; but as the Court assumed it to be true, the conclusion as to
judicial declarations has no firmer footing than it6 premise. A false premise
and a false conclusion stand and fall together. What is now established is
that, whenever a "real and substantial" controversy is presented in a form
9. Cf. American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 53 Sup. Ct. 98 (U. S. 1932), noted
in (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 427.
10. Fidelity Nat. Bank v. Swope, supra note 8; Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 279 U. S. 716, 724 (1929).
11. Boundaries: Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1 (1900); Arkansas v.
Tennessee, 246 U. S. 158 (1918); Georgia v. South Carolina, 257 U. S. 516
(1922); Oldahoma v. Texas, 272 U. S. 21 (1926); Michigan v. Wisconsin,
272 U. S. 398 (1926). Title to property: Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U. S. 533 (1892).
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enabling a court to pass judgment upon it, the judgment can be rendered
without raising any constitutional fears.
The question arises whether the federal courts will now render declaratory
judgments generally, without Act of Congress. Very probably, not. The ruling
of the Grannis case, that the Conformity Act cannot be employed generally to
introduce actions for judicial declarations in the federal courts, will probably
stand. But a federal declaratory judgments bill has three times overwhelmingly
passed the House of Representatives, 12 the third time as recently as December
19, 1932.13 With the Wallace decision to support it, the Senate will probably
fall into line. The federal bill forecloses any debate on a question which never
should have been raised, for it expressly provides that the federal courts shall
have power to render declaratory judkments "in cases of actual controversy."
There was no warrant ever to assume-as did the Michigan court in the now
overruled Anway case14 - that courts were required or even permitted to
render judgments in any other kind of case.
The foundation for federal declaratory judgments now having been laid, It
will be the function of the Court in future cases merely to determine whether
the particular issue before them presents a "case" or "controversy," a function
exercised also in every other proceeding, regardless of the form of relief prayed
for. The ordinary limitations on the grant of declaratory relief, namely,
whether it will terminate the controversy, will not be dispensed with. While
the milder form of declaration will suffice many plaintiffs who could have sued
for more coercive relief by way of injunction, specific performance, or other
drastic remedy, there will be many plaintiffs who can appeal for judicial relief
by declaration who could not otherwise invoke judicial protection. Narrowness
of view as to what is a "controversy" should not bar the latter from relief,
otherwise one of the major functions of the declaratory procedure will have
been lost. For example, in a recent ease 15 a street railway company, the
plaintiff, was authorized by a public utility commission to tear up part of
its tracks and substitute motor bus service. It thereupon made a contract with
the city for such substitution. Taxpayers and city officials, defendants, then
threatened the company that if it removed the tracks, it would subject itself
to a suit for damages, that its franchise would be forfeited, and that the con-
tract was illegal. Faced by this attack upon its rights, and fearing to incur
the dangers threatened, the company initiated an action against the challengers
for a declaratory judgment that the challenged contract with the city was
legal and that it was privileged to tear up the tracks without danger of com-
mitting the offenses and suffering the penalties charged. In sustaining and
praising the propriety of this proceeding, the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina approved the practice of deciding a controversy before irretrievable steps
had been taken and without requiring possibly fatal action-raising the tracks
-as a condition of securing an adjudication of the plaintiff's contested privi-
lege.16
12. H. R. 5365, 68 Cong. Rec. 9459 (May, 1926); H. R. 5623, 69 Cong. Rec.
2032 (Dec., 1928); H. R. 4624, 71 Cong. Ree. 724 (Dec., 1932).
13. See (Feb. 1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 121.
14. Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co., 211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350 (1920),
overruled in Washington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore, 249 Mich. 673, 229 N. W.
618 (1930), after Act was clarified.
15. Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Iseley, 167 S. E. 56 (N. C. 1933).
16. Cf. Morton v. Pacific Constr. Co., 36 Ariz. 97, 283 Pac. 281 (1929), and
cases in 45 HARv. L. REV. 793, 808 et seq.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
It may be hoped that the courts generally will realize the valuable social
functions performed by the declaratory judgment in removing clouds from rights
and will give the procedure the same scope and effectiveness as have the courts
of many of the American states and the courts of England.
E. M. B.
RESTRICTION OF INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION TO OFFENSES
CRIMINAL IN THE STATE OF ASYLUM
BY express provision in a few of the more recent extradition treaties I an
offense to be extraditable must be criminal in both the demanding and asylum
countries. And although the great majority of our treaties do not contain a
general provision to this effect, 2 the courts have assumed the necessity of
criminality in both jurisdictions. 3 This attitude apparently had its inception
in Wright -v. Henkel,4 the first case in which the Supreme Court determined
whether an offense charged was criminal by the laws of the asylum. The
treaty under which the proceedings had been brought, in common with most of
our treaties, contained an express provision in the section dealing with private
embezzlement, the offense in controversy, making criminality in both juris-
dictions necessary.5 Strictly the holding was limited to a finding that private
embezzlement was criminal by the laws of the asylum. But the language used
by the court was so broad as to indicate that criminality in the asylum was
considered necessary in all cases.6 The express provision as to private em-
bezzlement was explained by its recent inclusion as one of the treaty crimes
and the resulting necessity of making its scope clear.7 The use of identical
language in a treaty concluded some thirty years later, however, would seem
to militate against this reasoning.8 In two later cases the language of the
Supreme Court gave further indication that it would always consider criminal-
ity in the asylum an essential element 9 but in neither case was there a decision
on the point. Moreover, no American court has yet denied extradition because
an offense was not cripiinal at the asylum where this was not expressly made a
condition by treaty.1 0
1. U. S. Treaty Series, No. 836, Art. III (Germany, 1931); U. S. Treaty
Series, No. 822, Art. I (Austria, 1930).
2. No pre-war treaties contain such a provision.
3. Wright v. Henkel, 190 U. S. 40, 60 (1903); Kelly v. Griffin, 241 U. S. 6,
15 (1916); Collins v. Loisel, 259 U. S. 309, 311 (1922); Laubenheimer v. Factor,
61 F. (2d) 626, 629 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932).
4. Supra note 3.
5. U. S. Treaty Series, No. 139, Art. I, § 4 (England, 1889). This treaty
also contains such a provision as to violation of slavery laws, Art I, § 10. And
most of our treaties similarly limit particibation in or attempts to commit any
extraditable crime. For example see U. S. Treaty Series, No. 855, Art. 1, §
27 (Greece, 1932).
6. Wright v. Henkel, supra note 3, at 60.
7. Ibid. at 60.
8. U. S. Treaty Series, No. 855, Art. II, § 16. (Greece, 1932).
9. Kelly v. Griffin, supra note 3, at 15; Collins v. Loisel, supra note 8,
at 311.
10. But the Greek court denied extradition of Samuel Insull on the ground
that the offense charged was not criminal in that country, criminality being
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A practical objection to requiring criminality in the asylum is that it may
prevent uniform results in the application of the extradition treaties. For
if the act designated is not a federal crime, as will most often be the case, the
possibility of extradition may vary, depending upon the laws of the particular
state in which the fugitive is apprehended. This possibility is strikingly
illustrated by a series of recent e-tradition proceedings brought against several
fugitives who had been associated in a single offense. They were charged with
receiving money knowing it to have been fraudulently obtained, a crime included
in the British treaty in force at the time of their arrest." One defendant was
arrested in New York, a second in Illinois, and a third in Pennsylvania. In
consequence the curious situation was presented of three federal courts each
applying the law of a different state in passing on the extradition of defendants
guilty of identical offenses. In both New York 
12 and Pennsylvania '3 the offense
was held criminal in the asylum but in Illinois the district court made a contrary
finding.14 The Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed this holding and
found the offense criminal in Illinois.'
5
The fact that an offense is a treaty crime would seem to be suicient to
indicate a policy on the part of both countries favoring extradition for that
offense. And in the absence of mandatory provisions making criminality in
the asylum necessary, it would not be unjust to waive this requirement since
no offense would be included in the treaty which was not criminal either under
the federal laws or those of many of the states. Moreover by familiar rules
of statutory construction the inclusion of an express requiremeilt of criminality
in the asylum in sections dealing with particular crimes should exclude the
possibility of its being applicable to remaining crimes. Further the inclusion
of such a requirement in some treaties making it applicable to all crimes would
imply that a similar construction was not intended to be applied '
0 to all treaties.
One provision, found in most of our treaties has been relied upon as requiring
criminality at the asylum. It provides that "surrender shall take place only
upon such evidence of criminality, as according to the laws of the place where
expressly necessary under § 16 which dealt with the offense charged. See also
In re Frank, 107 Fed. 272 (D. Ore. 1901).
11. U. S. Treaty Series, No. 139, Art. I § 3. This treaty has since been
repealed and a new treaty adopted. Cong. Rec., Vol. 75, p. 4340 (Feb. 1932).
12. Klein v. Mulligan, 50 F. (2d) 687 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) cert. dmn. 284
U. S. 665 (1931).
13. Geene v. Fetter, 1 Fed. Supp. 637 (E. D. Pa. 1932). This case was
appealed and argued before the circuit court of appeals but extradition was
-waived before decision. This appeal seems to have been the first time that
it was strongly argued that criminality at the asylum was not necessary. Brief
of appellee, pages 26-47.
14. Oral opinion by Hon. George A. Carpenter (Feb. 11, 1932).
15. Laubenheimer v. Factor, szpra note 3. A motion to dismiss the appeal
on the grounds that the new treaty did not include the offense charged (Art.
II, § 18, defines the crime as receiving money knowing it to have been "stolen
or unlawfully obtained") and that proceedings under the old treaty became a
nullity was denied. Certiorari to the Supreme Court has been granted. See
N. Y. Times, March 21, 1933, p. 6. This case was complicated by a finding of
the Supreme Court in Kelly v. Griffin, supra note 3, at 15, that the offense
charged was criminal in Illinois.
16. See German treaty, supra note 1; Austrian treaty, supra note 1.
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the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his appre-
hension and commitment for trial if the crime or offense had been there com-
mitted." iT This provision may be interpreted as merely indicating what evi-
dence is necessary to hold a prisoner for extradition. Its inclusion in those
treaties in which another clause expressly requires criminality in both countries
gives strong evidence that it was intended to be no more than a procedural
rule.'S
The possibility that requiring criminality in the asylum will lead to unfortunate
results has to some extent been minimized by the attitude of the courts in not
insisting that "the name by which the crime is described in the two countries
shall be the same; nor that the scope of the liability shall be co-extensive or,
in other respects, the same in the two countries. It is enough if the particular
act charged is criminal in both jurisdictions." 19
RELATIONS OF PRIOR MORTGAGEE AND BUILDING LENDER UNDER
SUBORDINATION AGREEMENTS
WHERE the holder of a mortgage on unimproved property agrees to subordinate
his lien in order that the mortgagor may, by giving a first lien on the premises,
obtain a building loan,' he is ordinarily impelled to do so by the belief that
17. See U. S. Treaty Series, No. 561, Art. I (France, 1911); U. S. Treaty
Series, No. 789, Art. I (Poland, 1929); U. S. Treaty Series, No. 734, Art. I
(Czechoslovakia, 1926).
18. German treaty, supra note 1, Art. I; Austrian treaty, supra note 1, Art. I.
19. Collins v. Loisel, supra note 3, at 312. In all cases dealing with the
point a similar attitude has been taken.
1. Where a purchase money mortgage provides that the mortgagee will
subordinate to any building loan mortgage placed upon the property, the lender
whom the mortgagor-owner later secured has been successful in relying upon
this provision, although he had no specific agreement from the original mortgagee
to yield priority as to him. See Londner v. Perlman, 129 App. Div. 93, 118
N. Y. Supp. 420 (1908); cf York Mortgage Corp. v. Clotar Construction Corp.,
254 N. Y. 128, 172 N. E. 265 (1930). However, the lender would appear to be
in a safer position if he secured of the original mortgagee a particularized
subordination agreement, for the latter might otherwise later urge that the
building lender had not acted in reliance upon the offer to subordinate in the
purchase money mortgage. See York Mortgage Corp. v. Clotar Construction
Corp., supra, at 137, 172 N. E. at 268; dissent in Londner v. Perlman, supra.
Where the subordinator has agreed with the mortgagor to yield priority to a
designated building loan mortgagee, the latter is given priority though not a
party to the agreement, on the theory that he is entitled to rely upon the
understanding with the mortgagor. See Dunlap v. Teagle, 101 Fla. 721, 135
So. 132 (1931). Such an agreement to subordinate need not be in writing to
be effective. Rose v. Provident Saving, Loan & Investment Association, 28
Ind. App. 25, 62 N. E. 293 (1901); Mitchell v. West End Park Co., 171 Ga.
878, 156 S. E. 888 (1930). And equity will enforce a subordination agreement
where documentary evidence is non-existent. Leibers v. Plainfield Spanish
Homes Building Co., 108 N. J. Eq. 391, 155 Atl. 270 (1931).
If a subordination agreement is unrestricted it is enforceable in favor of
assignees of the building loan mortgagee. Darst v. Bates, 95 Ill. 493 (1880);
Leibers v. Plainfield Spanish Homes Building Co., supra; cf. Herron v. Herron,
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improvements will be made with the money thus obtained which will place him
in a superior security position despite his inferior ranking. A recent decision of
the New York Court of Appeals,2 however, demonstrates that the mortgagee who
fails precisely to delimit the scope of his agreement to subordinate will not be
permitted to resume his position of priority even though his expectations have
been frustrated.
The holder of a purchase money mortgage on a parcel of unimproved property
had consented to the subordination of its lien in favor of one to be acquired by
the lender under a building loan mortgage. In this latter mortgage was in-
corporated by reference, a building loan contract exdsting between lender and
owner, by the terms of which the owner was to construct a garden apartment
with adjoining garages. Zoning restrictions prevented the erection of the garages,
but advances for the completion of the apartment building were nevertheless
continued by the lender under a provision of the contract giving it the power
to waive strict compliance with the building specifications. The location of
the property was such, however, that the lack of garage facilities seriously
lessened the rental value of the apartments. Consequently the purchase money
mortgagee challenged in later foreclosure proceedings the priority claimed by
an assignee of the lender, contending that the failure to erect the garages
constituted a failure of consideration for the agreement to subordinate.
Judgment, however, went against the subordinator. The court declared that
the lender, in continuing advances for the erection of the apartment building
without the accessory garages, had but exercised the power accorded it by the
terms of the building loan contract, of which the subordinator had had both
actual knowledge, and constructive notice through the incorporation of that
contract by reference in the building loan mortgage to which the purchase
money mortgagee had been specifically subordinated. The court also stated
that the only act required of the lender to make the subordination agreement
binding was the advance of the stipulated sums under the building mortgage.
The terms of the subordination agreement imposed no further obligation upon
the lender, and the relations created by the subordination agreement placed
upon the lender only what the court vaguely referred to as a duty of good
faith to the subordinator. Thus, according to the view of the court, the lenqer
had been under no obligation to see that the moneys advanced were employed
by the borrower in the manner contemplated by the subordinator when he
consented to waive priority.
In view of the emphasis placed upon the terms of the building loan contract,
the decision may be interpreted to mean that unless there is some special under-
standing between the parties the building loan contract is to control their
respective rights. While in a few instances building loan contracts have served
to protect subordinated mortgagees against the enforcement of their waiver
10 Ohio Cir. Dec. 525 (1899). And its burdens run with the subordinated
mortgage to those taking with notice and even, according to some authorities,
to innocent purchasers. See Bank for Savings v. Frank, 56 How. Pr. 403
(N. Y. 1878); JONES, MORTGAGES (Sth ed. 1928) § 742. "Notice" itself appears
to be broadly construed. See Clason and Steever v. Shepherd, 6 Wis. 369
(1859) (recordation of waiver agreement is constructive notice to assignees);
Bank for Savings v. Frank, supra (knowledge of waiver on part of assignee's
attorney imputed to assignee).




agreements with" respect to sums not employed in improving the proporties,o
the protection which would be afforded them by building contracts in the usual
situations is of doubtful and uncertain value. The standard building loan
contract forms now in use embody a high degree of elasticity favorable to
the lending party,4 as is evidenced by the provision in the principal case
permitting the lender to waive compliance with the building plans as originally
specified. Drawn in this fashion, with a view to advancing and protecting the
lender's interests, such contracts will permit him to retain his priority although
the increased security relied upon by the subordinator fails to fully materialize.
And even where a lender breaches a building loan contract by withholding a
portion of the stipulated loan without cause, there seems to result no loss of
his priority as to amounts actually advanced.5
The decision in the principal case may be regarded, however, as primarily
an application of the doctrine that where the subordinator has taken no steps
to protect himself in the subordination agreement the lender owes him no duty
to see that the advances made to the mortgagor-owner are directed to the
improvement of the property. This view as to the relations arising between
purchase money and building loan mortgagees under subordination agreements
has been generally accepted by the courts. Priority ham been denied the lender
where he has connived with the borrower in diverting moneys in disregard of
the terms of the subordination understanding. But if the lender has advanced
the loan proceeds in good faith for purposes embraced within the terms of the
waiver agreement his position of priority will be unaffected by the borrower's
wrongful use of the moneys, for he is held to be under no duty to the subordinated
mortgagee to control the disposition of those proceeds in the hands of the
borrowing mortgagor.7 It is only where the subordinator has obtained of the
3. Lehnert v. Notlim Realty Corp., 251 N. Y. 340, 167 N. E. 463 (1929);
of. Godeffroy v. Caldwell and Rodgers, 2 Cal. 489 (1852), id. 3 Cal. 101 (1853).
4. See BmDsEYE's ABBOTT'S ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF FoRmS (1924) 1961.
5. United States Building & Loan Association v. Thompson, 41 S. W. 5
(Ky. 1897); Fidelity Union Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co. v. Magnifico, 106
N. J. Eq. 559, 151 At]. 499 (1930). In one instance a constructive trust has
been enforced in favor of lienors against the amount improperly withheld by
the lender. Anglo-American Savings & Loan Association v. Campbell, 13
App. D. C. 581 (1898).
Nor does a breach of the building loan contract by the borrower affect the
lender's priority in any way, although such a breach also frustrates the full
realization of the building improvement to which the subordinator looked for
his compensation. See Wayne International Building & Loan Association v.
Moats, 149 Ind. 123, 48 N. E. 793 (1897).
6. Claypool v. German Fire Insurance Co., 32 Ind. App. 540, 70 N. E. 281
(1904); York Mortgage Corp. v. Clotar Construction Corp., supra note 1;
Little & Son v. Bryan, 100 Fla. 1577, 131 So. 652 (1930) ; see (1929) 1 (No. 1)
FID. L. CHRON. 6. But of. Mitchell v. West End Park Co., supra note 1.
7. Darst v. Bates, supra note 1; Iowa Loan & Trust Co. v. Plewe, 202 Iowa
79, 209 N. W. 399 (1926); Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust
Co., 193 N. Y. 37, 85 N. E. 820 (1908); JONES, Zoc. cit. supra note 1; see
Anglo-American Savings & Loan Association v. Campbell, supra note 5. of,
Lehman v. Godberry, 40 La. Ann. 219, 4 So. 316 (1888); Tripp v. Babcock, 195
Mass. 1, 80 N. E. 593 (1907); Barry v. General Mortgage & Loan Corp., 254
Mass. 282, 150 N. E. 293 (1926).
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lender an express promise to see to the proper application of sums advanced,
or has stipulated for the assumption of such an obligation in the subordination
agreement, that the courts impose a duty upon the lender and deny him
priority to the extent that the obligation incurred has not been satisfied.
8
In addition to the possibility that the subordinator may be disappointed in
his expectations of enhancement in the value of the property, he runs the risk
that he may be deferred in ranking to a greater extent than he contemplated,
as a result of the filing of mechanics', contractors', and materialmen's liens. If
such liens attach between the recording of the original and the building loan
mortgage, the courts may shield the subordinator by so arranging priorities
as to defer him only to the extent to which he originally agreed.
0 But the
subordinator is not at all assured of such protection, 10 and if the liens attach
prior to the recording of either mortgage he will be postponed both to the lienors
and the building lender,
11 unless he has exacted of the lender a promise that he
wil be protected against such a contingency.'
2 Should the lender, however,
make advances over and above the amount agreed upon by the subordinator
the latter will be protected from a postponement to these additional sums.
13
Cognizant of these various pitfalls, a purchase money mortgagee who con-
templates subordination is in a position intelligently to attempt the safe-
guarding of his own interests. To what extent he will be successful in his
effort to shift to the building loan mortgagee the risk of the borrower's 
dis-
honesty or business ineptitude, will depend in the last analysis upon the
relative bargaining power possessed by the two interested parties.
8. Joralman v. McPhee, 31 Colo. 26, 71 Pac. 419 (1903); Albert & Kernahan
v. Franklin Arms, 104 N. J. Eq. 446, 146 AtI. 213 (1929); see Wayne In-
ternational Building & Loan Association v. Moats, supra note 5.
9. Hoagland v. Lowe, 39 Neb. 397, 58 N. W. 197 (1894) ; Bloom v. Thirty-Six
Berwyn Street Corp., 101 N. J. Eq. 142, 136 Atl. 803 (1927); Albert & Kernahan
v. Franklin Arms, supra note 8. Especially will courts protect the sub-
ordinator in such situations if equities exist in his favor. See Thorpe Block
Saving & Loan Association v. James, 13 Ind. App. 522, 41 N. E. 978 (1895);
United States Building & Loan Association v. Thompson; Fidelity Union Title
& Mortgage Guaranty Co. v. Magnifico, both supra note 5; Watson Land &
Improvement Co. v. Salyers, 247 Pa. 454, 93 AUt. 495 (1915); Dunn v. Wolf,
154 Wash. 445, 282 Pac. 842 (1929); see W. P. Fuller & Co. v. McClure, 48
Cal. App. 185, 191 Pac. 1027 (1920).
10. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Bateben, G Ill. App. 621 (1880);
Malmgren v. Phinney, 50 Minn. 457, 52 N. W. 915 (1892); Ohio Savings
Association v. Bell, 25 Ohio App. 84, 158 N. E. 548 (1926).
11. Iowa Loan & Trust Co. v. Plewe, supra note 7; Capital Savings & Loan
Association v. Vaughn Hardware Co., 163 Wash. 396, 1 P. (2d) 310 (1931);
Dunlap v. Teagle, supra note 1. With the Washington case here cited, compare
Dunn v. Wolf, supra note 9.
12. Wayne International Building & Loan Association v. Moats, supra note 5.
13. Althouse v. Provident Mutual Building-Loan Association, 59 Cal. App.
31, 209 Pac. 1018 (1922). The same court has reached a contrary result
where the subordinated mortgagee had knowledge of a provision in the building
loan mortgage permitting future advances by the lender. Machado v. Bank of
Italy, 67 Cal. App. 769, 228 Pac. 369 (1924).
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POWER OF MINORITY BONDHOLDERS' COMMITTEE TO COMPEL DISCLOSURE OF
LIST OF BONDHOLDERS
THE reorganization of a distressed corporate enterprise must be effected by a
plan which reconciles conflicting interests in such a manner as to gain both
judicial approval and the assent of a sufficient number of general creditors and
security holders.1 A court's approval will be gained if the plan is "fair." But
security holders often demand far more than what is "fair" as the price of
their assent. Hence, the reconciliation of the conflicting interests of the various
classes of general creditors and bond and stockholders is the task of the re-
organization committee-a body composed of the various protective committees
representing individuals of the different classes. 2 Generally the initiative in
the formulation of the plan is taken by the bondholders. Since they are gen-
erally scattered and unorganized, in the final analysis the enterprising force
is the banking houses which floated the issues.3 They have intimate knowledge
of the fiscal condition of the distressed corporation and often have the general
outlines of the reorganization plan prepared before the receivership. Deposits
are called for and with a sufficient number of bondholders depositing-and in
effect assenting to the plan-this protective committee is in a position from
the beginning to dominate the reorganization.4 The individual bondholder has
no opportunity for diagnostic thoughtr5 or else considers of little value the
alternatives to depositing: the dissentient bondholders' share of the upset
price or the power to demand modifications of the plan before the court enters
the decree of sale. At most, he can hope for an opportunity to cast his lot
with one of competing committees.
The most compelling reason for depositing with the "bankers" protective
committees-and the one made the most of in the battle for deposits-is that
1. The legal obstacles to achieving the will of the majority of the security
holders in a corporate reorganization has been discussed at length by: Rosen-
berg, A New Scheme of Reorganization (1917) 17 COL. L. Ruy. 523; Rosenberg,
Reorganization, The Next Step (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 14; Swaine, Reorganiza-
tion, The Next Step:,A Reply to Mr. James N. Rosenberg (1922) 22 Co. L.
REv. 121; Spring, Upset Prices in Corporate Reorganization (1919) 32 HARV.
L. REv. 489; Walker, Reorganization by Decree (1921) 6 CORN. L. Q. 154;
Cravath, Reorganization of Corporations in SoME LEGAL PHASE S OF COnPORAvE
FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION (1917) 153.
2. DEwING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (1926) 957 et seq.
3. Id. at 935; Note (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 377, 378 n. 2; see Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Reorganization, 131 I. C. C. 615, 701, 702 (1928).
4. Cravath, op. cit. supra note 1, at 162; Rodgers, Rights and Duties of the
Committee in Bondholders' Reorganizations (1929) 42 HARV. L. REV. 899, 904.
5. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Reorganization, supra note 3, Commis-
sioner Eastman's dissent at 701, 702, "Under the plan, those who do not become
parties 'within the periods limited or fixed therefor' can thereafter become
parties only 'upon obtaining an express written consent of the reorganization
managers,' and the latter are empowered '. . . to withhold or give such con-
sent' . . . In advertisement after advertisement the possibility, if not the
probability, of serious penalties if they did not come within the time limit was
made very clear to the security holders. . . ." Judge Hough is quoted byRosenberg, A New Scheme of Reorganization (1917) 17 COL. L. REV. 523, 528,




by virtue of their position they are qualified to reorganize pathological cor-
porations with a minimum of time and expense.0  That the actual plan will
embody the most satisfactory treatment of all concerned, however, is not a
necessary corollary-especially if there is present at the time of the deliberations
no organized opposition. And the court's adjudication as to the fairness of the
plan is often no adequate safeguard, for it is not prone to withold assent to
the plan at a time when lengthy deliberations have at last crystallized into
agreements.i
The reorganization of a large corporation requires intimate knowledge of
its financial condition and hence the theoretically desirable view that it should
be conducted by persons having no interests or affiliations adverse to any
group concerned seems impracticable, so far as industrials are concerned. 8
In lieu of the ideal, however, an approximation of an equitable plan may result
from a fair compromise between the majority groups who do not use their
position to oppress the minority, and sincere minority groups who are not
endeavoring "to levy tribute as a condition of abating the nuisance of their
presence." 9 There can be no compromise, however, if there is no powerful
and sincere minority. These "independent committees," however, most often
are powerless to combat inequality of treatment, because not only are they
organized later than the dominant "bankers" committees--and hence after a
substantial number of security holders have already deposited-but are not
even after their inception able to discover the identity of the security holders.
The power of an "independent committee" to compel disclosure of bond-
holders known to the already intrenched committees was considered by the
courts in two recent cases. In In re International Match Corporation,o two
Bondholders' Protective Committees were engaged in a campaign to secure
deposits of debentures of the bankrupt International Match Corporation. The
Independent Committee prayed for an order to enable it to have access to
whatever information had been gathered by the rival "organized" committee,
as to the identity and location of the holders of the debentures.U Their in-
tention was to circularize the bondholders for the purpose of obtaining authority
to represent them. The court, in denying the request, held that it had no
6. See DVwING, op. cit. supra note 2, at 937 (". . . this banking house
will 'invite' prominent bankers to become members, thinking by so doing to
give added respectability to their committee"). Yet the fact that security
holders have assented should not in itself weigh too heavily with the court
in its determination of whether a prayer for setting aside the reorganization
should be granted. See Eastman's dissent, szpra note 3 at 703.
7. Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the
Last Decade (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 901, 921 ("receiverships are always ex-
pensive luxuries, and once a plan of reorganization has been agreed upon by
a majority of the security holders, its prompt consummation is imperatively
desirable . . . " See Comment (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 974 n. 1. (". . . failure
to approve of a plan will undo the labor of years, prolong the receivership, and
involve further expensive negotiations between the various classes of security
holders").
8. But see Posner, Investors' Problcms in Receivership, MAGAzINE OF WALL
STRr, July 9, 1932, at 350.
9. CRAVATH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 197.
10. 59 F. (2d) 1012 (S. D. N. Y. 1932).
11. The debenture issues had been in form of bearer bonds and consequently
the bankrupt could not file a complete list of holders.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
concern with the outcome of the contest between the two committees. In the
case of Bergelt v. Roberts,12 a group of bondholders whose interests conflicted
with the dominant group, brought an action to enjoin a corporate reorganiza-
tion and prayed that the committee planning the reorganization be compelled
to disclose the identity of the bondholders. The court granted the desired relief
upon "general equitable principles," and particularly because it considered
that the relationship of the committee to the bondholders was a fiduciary one.
If, in the International Match case,13 the court's declared neutrality was
predicated upon the proposition that the contesting committees were competitors,
within the principle which disallows to one competitor access to the names of a
rival's customers, then it seems that the holding was based upon an erroneous
premise. Upon default, there is a common interest on the part of the investors
in salvaging what may be left of the investment. "And the machinery by
which arrangements between creditors and other parties in interest are carried
into effect" 14 is obviously far removed from the absence of a community of
interest which is symbolic of competition. If it may be presumed that the
Independent Committee in the International Match case was unable to secure
the information possessed by the organized group,15 the court's holding may
be productive of some unfortunate consequences. 10 For the refusal to compel
disclosure of the lists of bondholders may serve to check the efforts of an in-
dependent group at the very inception of the reorganization proceedings. It
may be argued, however, that these bondholders' lists, whether they are in the
possession of a committee or not, are still the property of the banking houses,
are part of their customer-lists and entitled to protection as such. But thin
property right would seem not inviolate when its preservation may result in
injury to the interests of the bondholders. It would seem desirable to furnish
the receiver with all lists, and to make available to all bondholders the in-
formation gathered by the committees. 16a
12. 258 N. Y. Supp. 905 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 236 App. Div. 777 (1st Dep't
1932).
13. Lee, Higginson and Co., one of the banking houses which originally
issued the debenture, appears to have been affiliated with the International
Match Corporation as well. It was they who announced the creation of four
separate committees to protect the interests of the holders of the issues. N. Y.
Times, April 9, 1932, at 19. Members of Lee, Higginson & Co. later withdrew
from the various committees. Lee, Higginson & Co., revealed that the bulk
of the defaulted issue was sold through members of a selling syndicate, totaling
600 members. N. Y. Times, May 20, 1932 at 42.
14. CRAVATH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 157.
15. If the information was within the Independent Committee's reach but
the Committee was reluctant to secure it because of the trouble and expense
involved, it would be obvious that another question would be present and the
Independent Committee would undoubtedly have no case to present.
16. Obviously a reorganization which is widely supported is less subject to
impeding suits. Moreover, since non-assenting bondholders must be paid in
cash, the burden of raising funds is lessened by each deposit obtained.
16a. The recent amendment to the bankruptcy act, providing for the reor-
ganization of railroads, requires the debtor or the trustees to prepare lists of
all known bondholders, etc. of the debtor. These lists shall be open to the
inspection of any creditor or stockholder. Bankruptcy Act § 77(c) (added
by Amendatory Act of March 3, 1933).
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If disclosure is compelled, the court is confronted with the problem of rational-
izing its decision. In the Bergelt case, the court appears to have been guided
by analogies to "the conceded rights of a stockholder to obtain the names of
fellow stockholders when -sought for the protection of joint interests," and to
the right of a cestui quo trust at all seasonable times to inspect the documents
relating to the trust.17 Perhaps the more satisfactory rationalization is simply
that of the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the majority or thoze
controlling or representing them, and the minority whose interests are equally
at stake.
17. See supra note 12, at 911. See (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 1435; (1933) 46
HARv. L. REv. 713.
